Control of a political party entails engagement in the guts of its system of committees

Merely voting for a candidate is a weak form of engagement and does not give the voter the power to influence the direction of the party.

There is now a younger generation of progressives who refuse to take seriously the question of how to build large organizations that can have a big impact on big politics in a big nation. Rather, these progressives sometimes seem attached to an almost Zen view of politics in which citizens should be brought to a sudden and exhilarating state of Enlightenment through debate and moral suasion — at which point the citizens will finally discover The Progressive Way. Yet the decades go by, and the only time in USA history when the progressives were winning were during the decades of Big Labor. Because in the modern era, only big organizations can win.

Many of these people are angry that President Biden is supporting Israel while Israel invades Gaza. Some progressives, both the young and also some older Muslims, are threatening to boycott Democratic candidates in 2024. They are hoping that withdrawing their vote will teach the Democrats a lesson, and thus force the Democrats to listen to their concerns.

On Twitter I asked:

Why don’t they simply get involved in the Democratic Party and then try to push it in the direction they want? Why don’t they learn something from Harry Hopkins or Michael Harrington or even, especially, Fannie Lou Hamer? I’m curious why, for more than a century, when progressives wanted to change the Democratic Party they found it natural to get more deeply involved in the Democratic Party, whereas now it is their instinct to pull away from the Democratic Party? And yet, look at how completely the Democratic Party was transformed over the last century. Think of how successful people like Harry Hopkins or Michael Harrington or even, especially, Fannie Lou Hamer, were in transforming the Democratic Party. Why not imitate them? They clearly knew something.

I got this response:

But this misunderstands the situation. It's not enough to vote for a party, that is a weak form of engagement. To gain power over a political party, a group needs to get involved in the internal politics of the party, and needs to form a permanent committee that can formalize the voice of the Muslim community inside of the Democratic Party. The question is this: when the leadership of the Democratic Party meets, do Muslims automatically have a representative in those meetings? That would be the obvious path to follow, if Muslims want to have real influence on the party. By contrast, if Muslims promise to not vote for the Democrats, then the Muslims lose all influence over the Democratic Party. Muslims only make up 1% of the USA population, they are too small a group to win influence based on their numbers alone. If they stop voting for the Democrats then the Democrats will ignore them from this point forward.

I also got this response:

This is precisely the situation where the party becomes more important than the question of which candidate has been elected to Congress. When a party is in the minority (and the Democrats are currently in the minority in the House) then the party lacks power in the legislature and cannot provide leadership. In such situations, leadership must come from the party, and so it is exactly such moments where it is important for Muslims to have an organized presence in the leadership meetings of the Party. As it was, Rep. Rashida Tlaib was censured by the House over her Israel comments. She is the only Palestinian in the House. 22 Democrats joined the Republicans in voting against her. It is unlikely this would have been possible if party leadership was stronger and if Muslims were formally represented inside of the leadership meetings.

Sarah Elise Wiliarty comments on a situation that arose in Germany. She writes “because the CDU was in the opposition, the parliamentary caucus was not as important as it had been when the party was in government.” This is the same situation that the Democrats now face in the House: they are in opposition, therefore they need strong party leadership more urgently than they would need if the Democrats controlled the majority of the House.

The CDU and the Politics of Gender in Germany: Bringing Women to the Party

By Sarah Elise Wiliarty

©2010 Cambridge University Press

Pg. 109

CHANGE IN THE DOMINANT COALITION, 1979-1982

The Social Committees, the Women’s Union, and the Youth Union had formed a dominant coalition within the CDU for much of the 1970s. These groups began cooperating in 1972, helped Helmut Kohl gain the position of party chair, and dominated the process of modernizing the CDU in terms of program and organization. This reform-oriented dominant coalition was able to control the CDU’s actions because its leaders built up the party organization as a counterweight to the party’s parliamentary caucus. The parliamentary caucus, under Carstens, was still controlled by national conservatives. However, because the CDU was in the opposition, the parliamentary caucus was not as important as it had been when the party was in government. The CDU used its time in the opposition to develop the extraparliamentary organization. The newly important party organization became much more important in terms of setting the CDU’s agenda.

This is the general rule, true in almost all democracies:

1. when a party controls the majority in the legislature then its legislative caucus leads the party

2. when a party is in opposition, its legislative caucus is weak, and so leadership must come from the party.

To be clear, I support Israel’s right to defend itself and I think House Representative Rashida Tlaib’s comments were tone deaf. But what I think doesn’t matter. In this essay I’m only focused on the question of why young progressives think they can gain power over the Democrats by not voting for the Democrats. Such disengagement will obviously lead to political irrelevance. 60 years ago young progressives knew they had to get into the party organization to change it. Why don’t they understand it now? When will they get serious about the lessons that political-science can teach them about how to be effective?

We can say with confidence that progressive movements in the USA will continue to sabotage themselves until such time as they get serious about the literature regarding how to build large-scale organizations backed by an efficient bureaucracy.

How will we make progress?

Eventually the progressives will realize that they cannot do an end-run around the political parties, so at that point they will hopefully get serious about the question of designing internal processes for the political parties that will make it more likely that those political parties will enact progressive legislation.

As in business, the design of a bureaucracy determines the output of the bureaucracy. A specific system of committees will produce one result, whereas a different system of committees will produce a different result. And this applies very much to political parties. An outstanding example of this is the German CDU, designed as a “decentralized corporatist catch-all party”. We should ask how it was that a party founded by conservative pro-life Catholics took the lead in legalizing abortion in Germany. The answer: the CDU has a committee devoted to women’s issues, and this makes the CDU responsive to women’s needs such that women’s concerns often triumph over any party ideology. And this is true in a general way: the CDU has many internal committees that represent the major demographic groups of Germany, and because of this the CDU is often forced to put ideology aside and instead respond directly to the real needs of those demographics. Perhaps it is because of this excellent internal organizational design that the CDU has dominated Germany politics since World War II, being part of the government from 1949 to 1969 and from 1982 to 1998 and from 2005 to 2021.

Page 55

One of the reasons that the CDU was able to dominate German politics so thoroughly during the 1950s was that the party successfully reached out to and integrated societal groups that might have offered opposition. The party recognized important groups by founding auxiliary organizations that were affiliated with the party. The CDU originally had seven auxiliary organizations: the Youth Union (Junge Union), the Women’s Union (Frauen Union), the Social Committees of the Christian Democratic Workers (Sozialausschüsse der Christlich-Demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft), the Municipal Politics Association (Kommunalpolitische Vereinigung), the Middle Class Association (Mittelstandsvereinigung), the Economic Council (Wirtschaftsrat), and the Refugees Union (Union der Vertriebenen und Flüchtlinge). In 1972 the party added an additional auxiliary organization, the School Pupils Union (Schüler Union), and in 1988 the newest auxiliary organization was created, the Seniors Union (Senioren Union). Additionally, two older CDU organizations do not have the official status of auxiliary organizations, but often act similarly: the Protestant Working Circle (Evangelischer Arbeitskreis) and the Ring of Christian Democratic Students (Ring Christlich-Demokratischen Studenten).

A certain group of young progressives often complain that the Democratic Party is not progressive enough. And yet progressives are oddly unwilling to learn what architecture for a political party is most likely to give progressives the results that they want. They rely on moral suasion and very little else. But if they want to build party that is forced to respond to the real demographic groups of the nation, then they would be wise to borrow ideas from the CDU.

Pg. 40-42

My concept of the corporatist catch-all party differs from the concept of the classic catch-all party in four ways: 1) party organization, 2) leadership, 3) membership, and 4) party policy making. These differences are summarized in Table 2.1.

A classic catch-all party has the following features. First, the primary internal party division is horizontal. In other words, the party has a leadership and a membership. Second, in a classic catch-all party, leadership is unified. Third, the membership of a classic catch-all party can only affect the party negatively by forcing leadership to follow a losing strategy. Fourth, a correct, i.e. winning strategy exists and the leadership knows what it is. The important question is whether or not the membership can prevent the leadership from pursuing this correct strategy.

Sarah Elise Wiliarty offer this example of a party membership that can cause the party’s defeat via their extremism. It is worth noting that this exactly mirrors what some Democrats fear most about the supporters of Bernie Sanders.

Pg. 33

Another possibility is that an overly “entrenched” membership will force through an inappropriate response. Both Kitschelt (1994) and Koelble (1991) examine the difficulties of the British Labour Party in the 1980s in this light. A takeover by the radical left rendered the party unelectable, even against the less-than-congenial Margaret Thatcher. If either constraint - insufficient leadership autonomy or overly entrenched membership - prevents the party from responding to voters (rather than members), then the party will lose electoral support as its position becomes increasingly disconnected from the preferences of wide segments of society. These theories share the ideas that membership acts only negatively on a party and that leaders should try to deactivate membership (though they may not succeed).

But a decentralized corporatist catch-all is completely different. It actually draws strength from its membership, which attempts to mobilize members to achieve wins. Since a decentralized corporatist catch-all has committees that represent many different demographics, there is no risk of extremists sabotaging the party, so long as all of the committees engage in an equal amount of mobilization.

Pg. 43-44

The third feature of a corporatist catch-all party is that members can help the party win elections rather than just hurt the party’s chances at the polls. Because of its distinctive internal organization, a corporatist catch-all party responds to new issues and electors in a different manner than the classic catch-all party. When a classic catch-all party reaches out to new groups, it demobilizes membership. For classic catch-all parties, this demobilization is necessary because of potential conflict between loyalists and floating voters. Loyalists would prefer that the party remain true to its founding ideals. New supporters are interested in the party only if it changes its original doctrine. Theories based on the classic catch-all party model assume that when a party appears internally conflicted, it will suffer at election time. The conflict is resolved by making the new tenets of the party so abstract that everyone can subscribe to them and by decreasing the power of both loyalists and potential new supporters, so that neither can significantly influence the party’s actions. Because old members will resist the move to broaden the appeal, classic catch-all parties must limit the power of membership if they wish to adapt successfully.

Corporatist catch-all parties operate according to a different logic. They respond to change by incorporating the groups advocating change into the party’s governing structure. Instead of weakening the links to both loyalists and floating voters as a classic catch-all party would, a corporatist catch-all party maintains organizational links to the loyalists, but also offers links to floating voters as these voters coalesce into interest groups. Through its recognition process, the party controls which groups gain representation. Pre-existing groups may or may not attempt to resist the party’s recognition of new groups, depending on whether they view the new groups as potential competitors or allies. The recognition process will therefore likely be contentious. Once both loyalists and new groups have access to the party’s decision-making structures, however, they must reach some kind of compromise with each other on what the party’s position will be. Represented groups are central players in defining party policy.

Unlike a decentralized corporatist catch-all, the modern Democratic Party is like an older, centralized catch-all party, of the type that was innovative in the 1890s but which seems obsolete in 2023. And even if the Democratic Party has gone through some modernization, the attitudes of an old-fashioned catch-all party continue to guide the party:

Pg. 34

This vision is problematic on two counts. First, like spatial voting theory, it assumes that only one best strategy is available and that leadership knows what it is. Second, the only role allowed for membership is as a negative constraint; members may or may not prevent leaders from implementing the “correct” strategy, which is identified by the leadership. This vision ignores the possibility that successful new ideas and strategies might come from membership groups, rather than party leaders. As Mair points out, decoupling membership from the party organization makes catch-all parties vulnerable to a decline in voter loyalty.

If progressives want to insulate the Democratic Party from the influence of wealthy donors, one potential path forward is design the Democratic Party as a decentralized cluster of committees, each of which represent the core demographics that the Democratic Party believes it can best serve. If the committees are strong enough, then they can push through their agenda regardless of the agenda of donors. All of which is to say, the Democratic Party could borrow some ideas from the CDU.

Pg. 38

As noted previously, the CDU was founded as a decentralized party. Although Adenauer was a powerful party leader, he had to bargain with multiple internal groups when making decisions for the party. One of the CDU’s primary strategies for managing rival tendencies within the party was to institutionalize representation for various groups on the party’s internal decision-making bodies. To give just one example, in an effort to convince Protestants to support the party, the CDU formed an internal group for Protestants and guaranteed this group access to party policy making. While the party’s goal is to win elections, its strategy for achieving that goal is to represent and balance societal groups internally. This strategy led the party to develop what I call a corporatist catch-all party structure.

Since the Democratic Party is a left-of-center party, it can also borrow ideas from those left-of-center parties that were designed as decentralized corporatist catch-all parties. Sarah Elise Wiliarty offers the example of the French Socialist Party:

Pg. 223-224

From 1969 to 1971 the French Socialist Party embarked on an internal transformation that would allow it to cooperate with the Communists from a position of strength. Beginning with its July 1969 conference, the Socialist Party committed to a strategy of attempting to unify forces on the left, including negotiations with the French Communist Party, the PCF. This was a clear rejection of the party’s other choice, attempting to ally with parties in the political center.

Between 1969 and 1971 frustrated groups on the left came together in a new party, the Parti socialiste (PS). At the Epinay Congress in June 1971, the new party elected François Mitterrand First Secretary. The PS also adopted internal proportional representation for ideological factions (or currents) on the party’s decision-making bodies. Prior to the transformation, the old Socialist party’s internal structure had been based on territorial units. The party’s leadership had been able to use this organization to exclude opponents from having influence within the party. After 1971 the units that were represented internally were primarily ideological currents. A five percent threshold required for representation was chosen to be low enough to ensure some voice for internal party minorities.

Under the PS’s new structure, ideological currents compete with each other for votes at party congresses. The results of these internal elections determine membership on the party’s National Council, which picks the top leadership. Ideological currents are generally led by powerful party leaders and are frequently (but not necessarily) rooted in a particular geographic territory.

The new internal party structure was a key component in forging an internal coalition to support Mitterrand. Some of the currents backing Mitterrand were small enough that they would have been excluded under the previous form of organization. These currents wanted to come together in an effort to win power, but were fearful of losing their identity within the larger Socialist Party. Internal representation was a solution for bringing these groups into the party while allowing them to maintain their original identities. Following these changes in internal organization, Mitterrand was elected leader of the PS.

The new internal structure gave the PS increased dynamism. The variety of ideologies represented within the party allowed the PS to appeal to diverse constituencies. The multiple ideological tendencies within the party also made the party appear open to internal debate, which was an exciting prospect. Membership increased from 75,000 in 1971 to 160,000 in 1977.

With new leadership and a new internal structure, the PS commenced writing a new program and opened negotiations with the PCF. The Common Program of the Left was signed in 1972. The ‘Union of the Left’ (which included the PS, the PCF, and a third left-wing party, the MRG) went on to do well in the parliamentary elections of 1973. Backed by the Union of the Left, Mitterrand nearly won the presidency in 1974, gaining 49.2 percent of the vote, compared to Valéry Giscard d’Estaing’s 50.8 percent. For the Socialists, the strategy of an alliance with the Communists was paying off at the polls. While this alliance experienced some rough patches in the late 1970s. It went on to victory when Mitterand won the presidency in 1981, the first candidate of the left to be elected in the Fifth Republic.

Conclusions

I’m pleading with those progressives who seem to think that moral suasion is the only possible technique that can influence politics. In fact, unless you have the charisma of Martin Luther King, moral suasion is the weakest tactic you can use. Getting directly involved in a political party and reshaping it from the inside will yield faster and more visible results. I beg progressives to get serious about organization building, and the design of committee systems. This is the only way to build a more progressive America.

(I borrowed some of this essay from my earlier essay, Progressives continue to sabotage themselves with inaccurate ideas about how democracy works.)