Democracy for Realists, Part 9 of 19
What is the appropriate role of political parties in a democracy? How fundamental are parties and institutions to the survival of democracy?
From the book:
Democracy for Realists, 2016
Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government
By Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels
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Page 59-60
The periodic economic contractions that punctuated the development of the industrial United States in the second half of the 19th century enhanced the appeal of third parties. Farmers, facing the most volatile conditions and some of the worst monopoly exploitation by the railroads, were a particular source of political agitation and third-party movements (Hofstadter 1955; Goodwyn 1976). Combining with western miners and southern cotton farmers, the rural protestors coalesced into a broad-based popular movement under the banner of Populism, mounting a third-party presidential campaign in 1892 and becoming a major party in several states. Because they saw themselves in bondage to Eastern monopolies, their platform was antimonopoly. Because they saw themselves in bondage to big-city political machines, their platform was also anti-political party and pro-direct democracy. As before in American history, extension of popular control was seen as the solution to contemporary evils.
During the Panic of 1893 economic distress became widespread. William Jennings Bryan’s fusion campaign in 1896, uniting Democrats and Populists, roared through the western states, the South, and parts of the Midwest. Bryan received 80% of the vote in Montana, for example, and the fusion ticket swept Republicans from the state government that year. The campaign frightened the centers of Republican dominance, but William McKinley held the East, Pacific Coast, and the upper Midwest, and Bryan ultimately fell well short of the electoral votes needed for election. Though he was to run twice more as the Democratic nominee, the Populists and their economic grievances declined rapidly in political importance. With little understanding of the need for party organization and broad coalition building, their political naiveté had proven costly.
The next period of extensive democratization, in the first decades of the 20th century, left a more significant institutional legacy. Heavy immigration was changing the character of American cities, and urban political machines were powerful players in both political parties. Reformers saw boss control, big-city Catholics, and crooked party machines as an unholy coalition that formed the chief obstacle to national political and social progress. Occasional splits in the GOP ranks produced “progressive” candidates running against both Democrats and Republicans. The Progressives eventually became a third-party force in many states, albeit with a distinctly anti-party inclination. The resulting tensions between ideology and organizational needs were to bedevil the Progressives’ attempts to displace the two major parties: ultimately the Progressives went the way of the Populists. However, the progressive wings of the two main parties, under the leadership of Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson, took a page from the Populists, enacting very limited versions of “trust-busting,” labor rights, the income tax, and direct primaries, all of which had their initial legislative success in this period. Without third-party competition, however, the two principal parties soon lapsed back into political quietism.
The democratic theory animating the Populists and Progressives was the folk theory of democracy. Those ideas directed their reform efforts along a particular path, providing a script for American reform movements that was to have fateful consequences for them and their successors down to the present era. Their allegiance to the folk theory hindered both their theorizing and their practical political efforts. However, to be fair to them, the central theoretical and practical dilemmas they faced remain thorny ones: What is the appropriate role of political parties in a democracy? And when parties stray from that role, how are they to be reformed?
It is no accident that the most progressive period of USA history, the New Deal of 1932-1968, was also the era when labor unions were at the peak of the strength. There is no movement in politics save for what movement is created by institutions. Not individuals, but institutions. There might have been a time, some centuries ago, when individuals played a larger role than they do now, but we can say with certainty that we live in the era of institutions, and for now this seems unlikely to change. (See our essay about the Panama Exception: with high levels of corruption and a history of dictatorship, Panama is at high risk of becoming an autocracy, and yet it has remained a democracy for 32 years, mostly because it has strong political parties.)
Progressives are often better at policy and slogans than they are at the creation of institutions. The public wants free health care, and health care remains an issue that gives progressives some traction in USA politics. It is a very popular issue. And yet, progressives lack the institutions to turn this very popular policy into a law.
The younger generation of progressives is gaining traction on Twitter and YouTube, mostly by creating good slogans and advocating for popular policies. There are some great podcasts where progressives talk about the need to tax the rich, forgive student debt, and raise the minimum wage, all of which are very popular ideas.
To a limited extent, the most popular people on these platforms can act as some of the great progressive newspaper pundits did 100 years ago. However, influence on Twitter and YouTube is fleeting. The great progressive pundits of the early and mid 1900s had the comfort of 50 year careers, by contrast, nowadays a few bad tweets might cost someone half of their followers. Someone can have a million followers, but make a sarcastic comment about race that some people take seriously, and then in the outrage and accusations and followers, those million followers simply evaporate. No newspaper ever lost subscribers as quickly as a YouTuber who is accused of making a racist comment. The problem is that the profound insecurity of these platforms makes it difficult for these progressive voices to have the same impact as the great progressive newspaper pundits of the early and mid 20th Century.
The point is, it is difficult to build reliable movements when the leaders of those movements are standing on quicksand.
In the summer of 2020, after the police murdered George Floyd, the USA saw the biggest mass protests movements since the 1960s. For a brief moment, it seemed like the nation was on the verge of real change. In another era, these massive movements might have been the spark for new institutions, but instead, the energy dissipated. People continued to express their rage on Twitter and YouTube but they retreated from the streets. No significant institutions were created, no nation-wide reforms were enacted. After a moment of intense emotion, the whole movement died out.
Many younger progressives seem to feel that Twitter and YouTube have empowered them to carry their message further than ever before. That is, social media balances the old power imbalances, it gives local people, all over the world, the chance to connect and support one another. But activists might consider the ways Twitter and YouTube actually make things worse than ever before. By putting the emphasis on self-expression, social media shifts the focus away from the hard work of building long-term movements.
Building institutions on the left has always been difficult. Both the Populists and Progressives had an anti-institutional bias that left them unable to compete with the better organized Republicans and Democrats. Part of the problem is that many of the people who are motivated to engage in left politics are so anti-authority that they dislike the idea of building an institution to replace the Democrats or Republicans, rather, what they want is no organized parties at all. And so such movements lose out, again and again, year after year, century after century. Such disorganized movements must inevitably lose out to the better organized movements, which are staffed by people who are less notably anti-authority. Well-organized parties can do a better job of raising money, training new people, and passing along social connections and skills to a new generation of leaders, generation after generation.
For those on the left who want to build institutions (that is, for those on the Left who want to achieve real change) one aim should be to seek changes to the political system such that the creation of grassroots organizations, and grassroots disciplines, become part of the political process, paid for by the government.
There are many ideas that might work in this way. I previously suggested electing 5% of all adults, to an intermediate assembly, between the public and the legislature, to help better filter the grassroots impulses as they rise up toward the higher levels of government. And also, in regards to supporting great journalism, we can follow the example that Britain has set with the BBC, with government support for media institutions. We should also learn from Britain’s mistakes. There have been efforts to politicize the BBC, so such an institution clearly needs a strong system to keep it independent. One possibility would be a Board Of Directors set up with long terms and a staggered schedule, for instance, one person could be appointed each year, for a term of 15 years, so the Board would consist of 15 people, picked by all the different leaders and parties that held power over 15 years. In most countries, 15 years is enough to ensure that the Board would always have a mix of political factions appointed to it, and also, 15 years means that there is no way for an angry, populist party to suddenly seize power of the institution. But changing the bylaws of such an institution would need to be beyond normal law, perhaps requiring a super majority or two majority votes separated by a few years.
What’s important is that we create some local organizations that can have influence over the national government. Rather than expecting poor and middle class citizens to pay for such institution-building activities out of their own pocket, the creation of such organizations need to be made part of the Constitution.
To put that differently: suppose you find a magic lamp and you rub it and a genie appears and says “I’ll grant you 3 wishes.” What should you wish for? Your first wish should be “I want an infinite number of wishes” People on the Left need to apply that thinking to politics. With limited time and money and attention, we should focus on those changes to the political process that would make it easier to make other changes to the political process. Institution building is in this category, it is something that then grants an infinite number of wishes. Once you’v built some strong institutions, the benefits pay off over many decades. Therefore this needs to be a goal.
To put that differently, we should develop a certain contempt for mere self-expression. Self-expression does not change the world, only institutions change the world. Therefore building institutions needs to be the goal for anyone who cares about democracy.