Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, an institutionalist?
How much does Putin believe in the legitimacy of institutions? He speaks of eloquently of a law based state, but he's comfortable using violence to stay in power.
How much does Putin believe in the legitimacy of institutions?
In recent years Putin has started going to church. He has presented himself in public as a faithful member of the Russian Orthodox faith. Yet he came up through the KGB when atheism was the official creed of the government, and he never seemed to have a problem with that atheism. So we should be skeptical. Perhaps he does not believe in God. So why does he pretend to? Why is he eager to be photographed at church?
It seems he believes in the power he gains by acting such a role. And, as we discussed in earlier essays, he plays many such roles. He pretends to be nachal’nik (the tough boss, a bit like Donald Trump's character in The Apprentice.) And let’s remember this bit:
(from Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin, Fiona Hill & Clifford G. Gaddy, Copyright © 2013 The Brookings Institution)
Putin has appeared in an endless number of guises for encounters with the press or Russian special interest groups, or at times of crisis, as during raging peat bog fires around Moscow in 2010, when he was transformed into a fire–fighting airplane pilot. All this theatricality is done with the assistance, it would seem, of the Kremlin’s inexhaustible wardrobe and special props department.
So then we have to wonder, when he talks about the importance of civil institutions, does he mean it, or is this another act? During the early years, Putin went far to convince the world that he was committed to institutions, even though, in the background, he was building an increasingly authoritarian system that was increasingly loyal to him personally. Consider how outsiders perceived the situation:
The official Russian state institutions (the parliament, the courts, and others), which were created by more genuine democrats in the 1990s, still remain in place. The formal structure of the institutions and the separation of powers have been preserved even if their functioning has been altered over the past decade. In theory, this offers the possibility of restoring a more institutionalized form of governance in the future. Unfortunately, because the functioning of Russian state institutions is now so connected to Putin personally, the institutions, in and of themselves, cannot necessarily be used by another individual to put Russia on a different trajectory of political development. The tandem experiment with Dmitry Medvedev as the Russian president underscores this point. Many observers anticipated that the constitutional authority of the Russian presidency, the power of the institution itself, would convey directly to Medvedev and enable him to make his own mark on the governing of the state. As Medvedev’s presidential term progressed, there was even considerable speculation that he would use the institutional prerogatives of the presidency to keep himself in the position for a second term – even by possibly going so far as to “sack” Prime Minister Putin and his team.
In Germany, Angela Merkel tended to believe the image Putin was selling. She was shocked in 2012 when Putin grabbed the Presidency again, switching places with Medvedev, and thus revealing that he planned to stick around forever, as a dictator would. In Russia, people were already convinced that he was a dictator, but in the West many had thought he would eventually step down and allow some kind of democratic process to take over in Russia. But after 2012 the truth became clear to everyone.
And yet, Putin continued to talk about the importance of the law and the importance of institutions. Was he lying about all of it? Was it just a performance to fool people? Or did he really believe some of this?
In Putin’s view, making law work is critical in creating a system in which the top executive does not have to intervene; this is the concept of the law–abiding state, the pravovoye gosudarstvo that we discussed earlier. The law lays down rules of the game. Abiding by the law means that things run according to plan. The first step is to ensure that the laws are consistent.
In the Millennium Message, Putin emphasized the importance of “constitutionalizing” the Russian state by bringing all of its laws into line. He asserted that this process would ensure the “constitutional safety of the state, enabling [or empowering] the federal center and [thus] preserving the integrity of the country.” Since 2000, Putin has made it a priority to direct and control the passage of legislation in the Duma and in the higher parliamentary chamber, the Federation Council, so that it is coordinated with his broader long–term goals. Strong courts also play an important role. They help systematize the state by sorting out the mess left behind by the Yeltsin–era of endless decrees, proliferating bilateral treaties between Moscow and Russia’s regions, and regional legislative innovation. Under Putin, Russia’s courts have been instructed to strike down regional laws that contradict federal statutes as well as the Soviet laws that remain on the books. The courts also help keep the tiers of governance in order and act as a kind of release valve for pressures building up in the lower levels of the system. For example, Putin has repeatedly insisted that electoral complaints must be referred to the courts rather than taken to the streets. The situation has been similar for business and other political disputes.
The thing about this is that it is true -- if you want to have a functioning society, one needs institutions that can handle problems at the appropriate level. One certainly needs independent courts to resolve legal matters, otherwise, how can businesses know that their contracts will be honored? And without contracts, how can business function at all?
Here is the heart of the puzzle. Putin is smart enough to analyze the situation and describe the importance of the law to the modern state. We no longer live in an age of tribal chieftains, who can rule by personal decree. We live in a world that is full of complexity. He can articulate why institutions matter.
Because he says things that are true, we are tempted to believe that he must be speaking from the heart. But what if he is, instead, only pretending? What if his nihilism is so extreme that he really does not care if Russia is well run, or poorly run? What if he only cares about corruption, that is, about his ability to steal money? What if he is willing to say anything that people might want to hear, so long as it helps him hang onto power?
How powerful is Putin? Is he all-powerful, beyond challenge? If so, then why does he need to engage in so many ridiculous acts? Why does he have to pretend that he is a judo master, a soccer champion, a deep diving expert, an economist, a philosopher, a military tactician of the first order, a hunter, a sniper, the ultimate KGB agent?
It is worth remembering that he was actually fairly bad as a KGB agent: when he went to Berlin, the West quickly identified him as KGB. His cover was blown. He plays a great agent on TV, but in real life he did not do so well in the field.
If his position is unassailable, then why does he invest so much energy in his various theater productions? Does he simply enjoy playing these roles? Does he crave the attention? Does he love being loved? Or does all of this count as a scaled-up version of the KGB's concept of "working with people"?
He has gutted all the institutions of the Russian government, yet he continues to pretend that it is the institutions that govern Russia. The Duma must vote on all laws, even though it is understood that this is simply theater. Does Putin feel this kind of "working with people" is preferable to using violence? It seems clear he has not wanted to rule using violence alone. He's wanted his government to seem more legitimate than that.
Perhaps he is addicted to power? Perhaps he really does believe that he, and he alone, can save Russia, and only by holding absolute power? Or perhaps he genuinely does not understand how much the system is undermined by the fact that government officers are afraid of him? It is odd that he rules through terror, yet doesn’t understand how that terror undermines his hopes that some parts of the government should operate automatically, without him having to get involved?
The question cannot currently be answered. Perhaps we will know more after he is dead.