If an elected representative is going to fight for their supporters, they need time to learn how to conduct that fight, and to gather the resources to win that fight. Otherwise they end up pandering.
> "Longer-terms in office don't lead to good governance, but instead, electing left-wing governments leads to good governance."
I'm not the originator of the above objection, but I can't help notice your response to it -- though full of details that are important to know -- feels to me a bit like circular reasoning. Shorter terms did create the problems you described for leftist governments, but only because of the fear of a rightist government winning power. So for that sort of leftist, a more "on the nose" alternative to longer terms could be a system that prevents rightists from winning power. For example, in the U.S. the broad political left could be locked into power with two seemingly-neutral changes:
- Make D.C. a state, and also several dozen other large dense cities. This would stack the Senate with Senators elected by the demographic least likely to be rightist.
- Use large single-winner districts and a good Condorcet method, such as Ranked Pairs. Such methods create a strong tendency to elect someone at the political center of the district. Contrast this with the US's current method which tends to elect someone at the center of the district's largest party. Additionally, the political center of the district typically moves gradually, because the median is robust to shifts in outliers. Contrast this with PR systems in which crises often lead large blocs of voters to shift to more extreme parties. A sudden change in political winds would be all but ruled out, even as the clone-proof property of Ranked Pairs would allow any corrupt individual official to be thrown out.
"Shorter terms did create the problems you described for leftist governments, but only because of the fear of a rightist government winning power."
I agree, this is one of the weaker arguments I've made, at least since there are multiple variables here, and I have not bothered to spell them all out. As an example of what I mean, assume a situation where 5 politicians are elected every month for a term of 11 years, so the legislature has 660 people and 0.7575% of the legislature turns over with each month's election. In such a case, it would take years of relentless victory for one party to build up the kind of large majority that would give it the mandate to make dramatic changes. I've advocated for such a system, and yet it eliminates the possibility of a landslide election that seems to give a mandate to one party. But here is part of my reasoning:
-----------------------------
Democracy for Realists, 2016
Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government
By Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels
Page 312
The result is that, from the viewpoint of governmental representativeness and accountability, election outcomes are essentially random choices among the available parties – musical chairs. Elections that “throw the bums out” typically do not produce genuine policy mandates, not even when they are landslides. They simply put a different elite coalition in charge. This bloodless change of government is a great deal better than bloody revolution, but it is not deliberate policy change. The parties have policy views and they carry them out when in office, but most voters are not listening, or are simply thinking what their party tells them they should be thinking. This is what an honest view of electoral democracy looks like. It is a blunder to expect elections to deliver more.
-----------------------------
In other words, in the view of Achen and Bartels, those historic landslide elections are all illusions that have been misinterpreted. The USA Democrats in 1932, the British Tories in 1979 -- those seeming landslides did not mean what we often think they mean.
To the extent that real mandates appear in politics, they appear over time. The American public did not give a mandate to the Democrats in 1932, but they did give a mandate to the Democrats by keeping them in the Presidency for most of 1932-1968 and giving the Democrats control of the House for all but 6 years of 1930-1994. In other words, the only real mandate is the mandate that appears slowly, over time, and is built up of multiple victories over many years.
Getting rid of historic landslides means getting rid of the illusion of fake mandates. Also, doing so eliminates the shock election result, like Germany in 1932 or Brexit in 2016 or the election of Donal Trump in 2016. All real, lasting, and profound political change should require multiple victories in multiple elections.
For that reason I favor a system where the elections to the legislature are heavily staggered. But, of course, we should also want the elected leadership to be highly skilled and to know how to proceed once it gains power, therefore long-terms must be an essential part of this.
The need for skill in leadership is something I mention a bit about when discussing highly specialized committees, here:
"Make D.C. a state, and also several dozen other large dense cities. This would stack the Senate with Senators elected by the demographic least likely to be rightist."
I think I used a similar example in an earlier essay, though I suggested giving statehood to Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, and some other possessions, cutting them all in half and making each half a state, thus creating 10 new states likely to vote for Democrats.
It is an interesting thought experiment, to ask what the USA would be like if Democrats leaned on the Electoral College as much as the Republicans do. Would it amount to the end of democracy in the USA if the Democrats were to be so bold in grabbing power? Would it force a reckoning over the non-democratic nature of the Senate?
There are some situations where more is generally better (such as a more educated citizenry, more civic associations, and more efficiency, etc.) Most people understand that more spending won't solve a problem which is why there is austerity and widespread concern about national deficits but the cost of running a technological society, uneven distribution of funding, and an aging population requiring more healthcare are part of what makes it difficult to reduce.
Whatever you want to see from the political system, this remains true:
"What’s crucial is this: if a weak group manages to elect a representative who is willing to do battle on behalf of that weak group, then short terms in office only weaken that representative, and therefore help keep the weak group permanently weak. Longer terms at least allow the elected representatives to go out and fight."
If you want a politician to fight for austerity, then you should hope that politician has such a solid hold on their position that they can survive a potential backlash.
> "Longer-terms in office don't lead to good governance, but instead, electing left-wing governments leads to good governance."
I'm not the originator of the above objection, but I can't help notice your response to it -- though full of details that are important to know -- feels to me a bit like circular reasoning. Shorter terms did create the problems you described for leftist governments, but only because of the fear of a rightist government winning power. So for that sort of leftist, a more "on the nose" alternative to longer terms could be a system that prevents rightists from winning power. For example, in the U.S. the broad political left could be locked into power with two seemingly-neutral changes:
- Make D.C. a state, and also several dozen other large dense cities. This would stack the Senate with Senators elected by the demographic least likely to be rightist.
- Use large single-winner districts and a good Condorcet method, such as Ranked Pairs. Such methods create a strong tendency to elect someone at the political center of the district. Contrast this with the US's current method which tends to elect someone at the center of the district's largest party. Additionally, the political center of the district typically moves gradually, because the median is robust to shifts in outliers. Contrast this with PR systems in which crises often lead large blocs of voters to shift to more extreme parties. A sudden change in political winds would be all but ruled out, even as the clone-proof property of Ranked Pairs would allow any corrupt individual official to be thrown out.
These are good arguments. About this:
"Shorter terms did create the problems you described for leftist governments, but only because of the fear of a rightist government winning power."
I agree, this is one of the weaker arguments I've made, at least since there are multiple variables here, and I have not bothered to spell them all out. As an example of what I mean, assume a situation where 5 politicians are elected every month for a term of 11 years, so the legislature has 660 people and 0.7575% of the legislature turns over with each month's election. In such a case, it would take years of relentless victory for one party to build up the kind of large majority that would give it the mandate to make dramatic changes. I've advocated for such a system, and yet it eliminates the possibility of a landslide election that seems to give a mandate to one party. But here is part of my reasoning:
-----------------------------
Democracy for Realists, 2016
Why Elections Do Not Produce Responsive Government
By Christopher H. Achen & Larry M. Bartels
Page 312
The result is that, from the viewpoint of governmental representativeness and accountability, election outcomes are essentially random choices among the available parties – musical chairs. Elections that “throw the bums out” typically do not produce genuine policy mandates, not even when they are landslides. They simply put a different elite coalition in charge. This bloodless change of government is a great deal better than bloody revolution, but it is not deliberate policy change. The parties have policy views and they carry them out when in office, but most voters are not listening, or are simply thinking what their party tells them they should be thinking. This is what an honest view of electoral democracy looks like. It is a blunder to expect elections to deliver more.
-----------------------------
In other words, in the view of Achen and Bartels, those historic landslide elections are all illusions that have been misinterpreted. The USA Democrats in 1932, the British Tories in 1979 -- those seeming landslides did not mean what we often think they mean.
To the extent that real mandates appear in politics, they appear over time. The American public did not give a mandate to the Democrats in 1932, but they did give a mandate to the Democrats by keeping them in the Presidency for most of 1932-1968 and giving the Democrats control of the House for all but 6 years of 1930-1994. In other words, the only real mandate is the mandate that appears slowly, over time, and is built up of multiple victories over many years.
Getting rid of historic landslides means getting rid of the illusion of fake mandates. Also, doing so eliminates the shock election result, like Germany in 1932 or Brexit in 2016 or the election of Donal Trump in 2016. All real, lasting, and profound political change should require multiple victories in multiple elections.
For that reason I favor a system where the elections to the legislature are heavily staggered. But, of course, we should also want the elected leadership to be highly skilled and to know how to proceed once it gains power, therefore long-terms must be an essential part of this.
The need for skill in leadership is something I mention a bit about when discussing highly specialized committees, here:
https://demodexio.substack.com/p/why-have-politics-in-the-usa-become?s=w
The importance of great leadership is something I mention here:
https://demodexio.substack.com/p/how-do-we-get-great-leadership?s=w
About this:
"Make D.C. a state, and also several dozen other large dense cities. This would stack the Senate with Senators elected by the demographic least likely to be rightist."
I think I used a similar example in an earlier essay, though I suggested giving statehood to Puerto Rico, the US Virgin Islands, Guam, and some other possessions, cutting them all in half and making each half a state, thus creating 10 new states likely to vote for Democrats.
It is an interesting thought experiment, to ask what the USA would be like if Democrats leaned on the Electoral College as much as the Republicans do. Would it amount to the end of democracy in the USA if the Democrats were to be so bold in grabbing power? Would it force a reckoning over the non-democratic nature of the Senate?
There are some situations where more is generally better (such as a more educated citizenry, more civic associations, and more efficiency, etc.) Most people understand that more spending won't solve a problem which is why there is austerity and widespread concern about national deficits but the cost of running a technological society, uneven distribution of funding, and an aging population requiring more healthcare are part of what makes it difficult to reduce.
Whatever you want to see from the political system, this remains true:
"What’s crucial is this: if a weak group manages to elect a representative who is willing to do battle on behalf of that weak group, then short terms in office only weaken that representative, and therefore help keep the weak group permanently weak. Longer terms at least allow the elected representatives to go out and fight."
If you want a politician to fight for austerity, then you should hope that politician has such a solid hold on their position that they can survive a potential backlash.